The Meaning of Psychological Claims
According to the verification theory of meaning, a proposition is meaningful if and only if it has a set of possible verification conditions — that is to say, a set of observable physical conditions which, if present, would justify a claim that the proposition is true (Lycan 99). If all of the verification conditions which would make the claim true are present (Hempel 18), it would be justified to believe that the claim is true. Otherwise, the claim is likely false[1]. If there are no verification conditions, then the claim is merely a meaningless “pseudo-statement” (Hempel 17). In this paper, I shall consider a subset of propositional claims, viz., those concerning psychological states. I shall argue that at least with respect to psychological claims, the verification theory is correct. I shall refer to the verification theory, when it is applied to psychological[2] claims, as logical behaviourism.[3]
An example of a (non-psychological) propositional claim is, “There is water in the glass.” The set of verification conditions includes: That one can observe a clear liquid substance inside the glass; if one puts the substance in his mouth it tastes like water; and if a chemical analysis of the substance in the glass were preformed, the test result would be consistent with the chemical makeup of water. It is justified to infer the results of a would-be chemical test, as well as the status of the other verification conditions (without observing each one of them) because of the strength of the initial observations (viz., sight and taste)[4]. If the substance in the glass looks and tastes like water, then there is justification for the claim that there is water in the glass.
On the other hand, an unverifiable proposition is meaningless. There are no verification conditions for “God loves me,” because there are neither known nor reasonably foreseeable methods for observing either God or love; thus, there is no way to determine the truth or falsity of such a claim. And as we shall see, psychological states would also be non-verifiable if we could not compile a list of observable physical conditions which we would expect to be present if that psychological state existed.
Now, it is important to note that logical behaviourism is forgiving in at least two ways. One, as mentioned above, not every verification condition need be observed. Rather, they can be inferred by the existence from one or more of the remaining verification conditions. Two, verification conditions can include those made reasonably observable by anticipated improvements in sense-extending technology. For example, although the existence of life on Jupiter’s moon Europa may not be verifiable today, the proposition “There is life on Europa” has meaning because it plausibly will be verifiable in the future[5].
Now, let’s consider claims about psychological states. What is the meaning of a claim such as “John is embarrassed”? According to logical behaviourism, this claim has meaning only with respect to its observable verification conditions. Unfortunately, however, “embarrassment,” if it were a non-physical phenomenon, would be no more observable than “God” or “love.” Because of the other minds problem (Searle 12–14), there is no way to experience the first-person qualia (what it is like to feel embarrassed) of another person.
Moreover, a person’s descriptions of her private experiences may not be reliable evidence for inferring the nature of those experiences in the context of public meaning. There seems to be no certain way to match my private experience when I describe it as “embarrassment” with another person’s private experience when she describes it in the same way (as “embarrassment”). This problem is elucidated by the inverted spectrum thought experiment, which shows that it is plausible that when people describe perceptions in a common way, in this case descriptions of the colour of objects — and thus believe they agree about the properties of the things they are observing — they are in fact having distinct experiences. The scenario presented by Neil Campbell suggests that Jane and Anna, two interior designers, each respond in identical ways even though each is presented an object with a distinct colour. When Jane looks at a red object, she has the kind of experience Anna has when Anna looks at a green object. Looking at the same object, Jane and Anna both exclaim “Red!” yet are having distinct experiences (92–93). Descriptions of emotional states may be subject to the same variability from one person to the next.
Embarrassment, when considered as a private emotional state, seems to be non-verifiable, and thus claims about another person’s “embarrassment” are rendered meaningless. However, the meaning of such psychological claims is salvageable if there are publicly observable physical conditions which are expected to be present if the claimed emotion exists. Indeed, there may be. For example, since embarrassment per se, as a non-physical and non-observable state is meaningless, we can say embarrassment is meaningful if there are observable conditions which would show that it exists, e.g., red face, tilted head, silence, and other conditions.[6] If we observe some of these conditions in John, we can then infer the status of the other verification conditions, and justifiably claim John to be embarrassed.
We can see evidence that the verification theory for psychological claims makes sense if we accept that mind states are biological. Whether they are identified with brain states (as reductionist theories of mind hold) or emergent biological processes, then it is plausible that technology will someday enable us to identify emotions from brain scans. Therefore, that John’s brain is in observable state x is a verification condition for embarrassment — indeed, brain state x — together with a red face, tilted head, and silence — is the meaning of the claim that John is embarrassed. A brain scan may not be available now, but we can justifiably infer its result on the strength of the other observable conditions, and on the plausibility that brain scans will be available in the future. Moreover, if one believes that psychological states are identical to brain states, then it would be a mistake to deny logical behaviourism, because to do so would be self-contradictory in that there would be nothing other than brain states with which to test claims of psychological states. If mental states are identical to physical brain states, then brain states are the verification conditions precisely because to make a claim about a psychological state is nothing more nor less than to make a claim about a physical brain state. It would be a mistake to think of claimed psychological states as causes of physical symptoms rather than as private, first-person ways of describing physical states themselves.
For those skeptics who are reluctant to accept that psychological states are identical to physical states, please consider this. It is well known that anxiety is associated with rapid, shallow breathing. A logical behaviourist would say that the meaning of anxiety is (as one of several verifiable conditions) rapid, shallow breathing. As a skeptic of logical behaviourism, one might be inclined to say that rapid, shallow breathing is merely a symptom of a distinct mental state, namely anxiety — it is not the anxiety itself. But it is also commonly known that intentionally slowing and deepening one’s breath is often an effective method of reducing anxiety. I suggest that it is not plausible that altering a mere symptom of a condition would alter the condition itself, if the condition and its symptom were indeed two distinct things. It is more plausible that the anxiety and its “symptom” are rather one in the same. That “I have anxiety and it is causing rapid, shallow breathing” is a mistaken notion, because rapid, shallow breathing is the meaning of “anxiety.” By slowing one’s breathing, one is relieving the anxiety itself. In first person, the description of the condition comes out as the utterance, “I feel anxiety.” But since a feeling is not publicly observable, we look for the publicly observable signs of anxiety such as rapid, shallow breathing. This is what logical behaviourism says, and this seems completely reasonable.
Let me address a possible objection to logical behaviourism — that of the logical fallacy affirming the consequent: “If John is embarrassed, then John’s face is red, his head is down, and he is quiet. John’s face is red, his head is down, and he is quiet. Therefore, John is embarrassed.” This is a fallacy, because those same conditions might belong to states other than embarrassment. But my response is as follows: Once technology allows us to directly observe physical brain states, we will be able to make a complete and definitive list of verification conditions for psychological states, such that we can make biconditional statements, e.g., “If and only if John is embarrassed, then John’s face is red, his head is down, he is quiet, and his brain scan reads x.” Then the following statements would complete a valid argument and thus overcome the objection: “John’s face is red, his head is down, he is quiet, and his brain scan reads x. Therefore, John is embarrassed.
Logical behaviourists do not need to deny the existence of mental states. They merely need to point out that claims about mental states derive meaning only by observing the conditions which are expected to be present if such states exist. Since one cannot observe the way it feels to another person to be in such a state, one has no choice but to observe the publicly available conditions which accompany those states — or, if one accepts the identity theory of mind and body — are identical to those states. Fortunately, such publicly-observable conditions are often available. With advances in technology enabling the observation of the brain, additional verification conditions for mental states will likely become observable in the future. Taken together, the availability of publicly observable verification conditions and the unavailability of private mental experiences as objects of public study make logical behaviourism the correct theory for evaluating psychological claims.
Works Cited
Campbell, Neil. A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Peterborough: Broadview Press Ltd., 2005. Book.
Hempel, Carl G. “The Logical Analysis of Psychology.” Block, Ned. readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press, 1980. Print.
Lycan, William G. Philosophy of Language: a Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.
Searle, John R. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Vienna Circle.” 2016. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/>.
[1] Belief in the falsity of a claim could also be justified by the presence of falsification conditions (Lycan 99).
[2] I use mental states and psychological states interchangeably.
[3] Also known as analytical behaviourism and philosophical behaviourism.
[4] According to Hempel, “. . . one verifies only some of the test sentences and then infers that the others obtain as well” (18).
[5] There was a movement within the Vienna Circle to liberalize the verification requirements (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
[6] Is someone’s response to the question, “Are you feeling embarrassed” a verification condition for embarrassment? I would say that it is not, because someone feeling embarrassed may not want to admit it. Thus, the person’s response to the question is not a reliable indicator. Moreover, the experience of embarrassment does not entail a verbal acknowledgement.
