Modern Challenges to Eurocentric Metaphysics and Its Application
Introduction
In this paper, I intend to justify the following claims: Certain metaphysical commitments are constructed by people (their mode of existence is subjective), rather than features of the objective world independent of human beliefs — yet people mistakenly take them to be objective facts of the world (if this were so, it would be futile to question them); because such beliefs are ontologically subjective, they can (and do) change when rational people elect to change them; and that there is now good reason to change certain metaphysical commitments of Eurocentric philosophy, e.g., to make Eurocentric philosophy internally consistent, to correct unsustainable environmental practices, and to fulfill moral obligations. In making my case, I will focus on Eurocentric philosophy[1] and its internal inconsistencies. (But this is not to suggest that it is unique either in its ontological subjectivity or its problems.)
First, let me give some examples of the problems to which I refer. Western philosophy embraces universalizable moral duties such as justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence; and Western political theory embraces human rights, freedom of religion, and environmental protection. But Eurocentric philosophy views private land ownership as a natural right; and is committed to culturally-relative definitions of religion, individual autonomy, and freedom to pursue one’s own good — so long as others are not harmed. But this latter set of principles, when taken together with recognized moral duties, sometimes renders Eurocentric philosophy internally inconsistent. For example, a Western culture-specific definition of religion may be blind to another culture’s religious practice, thereby rendering the promise of “religious freedom” hollow.
Human Beliefs Are Distinct From The World In Itself
It is crucial to my thesis to establish the distinction between ontologically subjective human perception on one hand, and ontologically objective things that exist independent of human perception, on the other. People often mistakenly assume that what they perceive is objectively true of the world. This leads to false, unconscious assumptions that cultural phenomena, e.g., Eurocentric values, are part of the fixed external world. I will assert several justifications for this claim.
Humans perceive representations of the world (not the world in itself)
This model, called indirect realism, is also known as sense-datum theory (Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction 180), and representative realism or causal realism (Feser, Philsophy of Mind 8). In general, it is a claim relevant to epistemology and philosophy of mind which asserts that people perceive mere representations of the world rather than the world itself. That is to say, people do not perceive the world outside their minds directly, but rather interact with sense data — representations of the physical world (Feser, Philsophy of Mind 8). This is because sense data are distinct from physical objects[2] (Coates). When we “see” an apple in our present experience, what we are in fact seeing are sense data, which are distinct from the actual apple (which therefore may or may not exist, or may have properties different from what we perceive.) Let’s more closely examine the evidence that people perceive sense data rather than the world itself.
Missing data
Our senses are biologically capable of perceiving only a subset of all available data which is situated in the outside world. What we call the “visible light spectrum” is precisely (by definition) the particular range of electromagnetic wavelengths that we can “see.” Radio, microwave, and x-rays are all identical in composition to “visible” light but differ only in wavelength — and we are oblivious to them in our here-and-now experience (unless we have electronic instruments which extend our senses and allow us to perceive such waves)[3]. Thus, our representational scene excludes significant features of the natural world. We navigate our daily lives completely oblivious to the bombardment of electromagnetic waves which fall outside of the visible spectrum. We are oblivious to dangerous radiation from nuclear power plants and military installations[4]. Indeed, children at one popular day camp in California were exposed to Strontium-90 and other radioactive contaminants for decades but had no clue. (EnviroReporter.com).
Distorted data
There are endless examples of how our perceptions of the world are distorted. A first example: If one views a coin from various angles, its appearance changes. But it would be incorrect to say that there is a particular angle from which one sees the coin accurately, because light is always distorted to some degree or other as it interacts with constituents of the air. We can claim that some viewing angles are more accurate or less accurate than other angles, but that is different than claiming that one angle provides a completely accurate depiction of the actual shape of the coin. Thus, in all cases, we are seeing a distorted representation of the coin. We can infer characteristics and spatial location of the coin more accurately via sense extenders and logic than we can via our native sense capabilities[5] (Schmidt, Langheinrich and Kersting). Another example is the well-known unreliability of eyewitnesses in criminal investigations. In many cases, eyewitness accounts are not correct representations of actual events (Arkowitz and Liliienfeld).
Added data
If one holds a finger close to the face, two fingers are perceived. But there are more profound examples of information present in human perception of the world which may not actually part of that world. Aristotle famously perceives goal-directedness in nature (final causes), but such teleology is contested by contemporary theorists such as John Searle. While he accepts brute causal chains themselves, Searle denies that “purposes, goals, and objectives” are intrinsic in nature; rather, they “exist only relative to human and animal agents” (Mind, Language 122). That is to say, Searle claims that where causation exists, events have no functions except those which are attributed by people. For Searle then, functionality only exists to the extent it is attributed by agents who have, in their minds, a presupposed teleology which is derived from human values. For example, says Searle, a beating heart only serves the function of pumping blood relative to the pre-supposed purpose of sustaining life — because life is “good” — which is an attribution made by people. If people did not value life, they could not speak of “better” or “worse” hearts. (Mind, Language 122) Searle sums up his claim bluntly as such: “. . . I want to advance a strong thesis about the notion of functions: all functions are observer-relative in the sense I just explained. They only exist relative to observers or agents who assign the function” (Mind, Language 121). The important point here is that if Searle is correct, people impute significant content to “nature,” i.e. teleology, although the content is situated in their own minds.
Thus, my view of indirect realism is consistent with Searle’s account of the origins of perceived teleology, i.e., not in nature outside the human mind, but rather in the minds of humans themselves.[6]As we can see, this view that perceived “function” in nature is situated in the minds of people is consistent with the version of indirect realism I am proposing. Perceived purposiveness is attributed by people and added to the representation of the world, in the human mind.
Why these errors in representation provide evidence for indirect realism
We may be able to infer from scientific inquiry that accidental genetic mutation explains the illusion of teleology. We may be able to infer from physical evidence what happened at a crime scene. Science may tell us that the appearance of two fingers is an optical illusion. In each case, the point is that our representation is in error and we know that is in error because we can use inference to determine what is correct. Therefore, it is problematic to assert we are seeing the world directly, because we can infer via science that the world is different than what we “see.”
If humans construct and perceive a mere representation of the world, it’s plausible that they mistakenly attribute values and a particular order to the world in itself, when such phenomena are situated only in representations. This is a crucial premise in my thesis, because we can then understand how assumptions such as land ownership and personal space are situated in human minds, not in the mind-independent world.
Epistemic and Scientific Structural Realism
Bertrand Russell asserts that all we can know through perception about the physical world is its structure, not its intrinsic nature. (Feser, Philsophy of Mind 125) The information science gives us is less than we assume — specifically, science tells us about molecular structure and causal relations but that is all (Feser, Philsophy of Mind 126). If science is an accurate picture of the world yet science tells us only about structure, then it follows that our perceptions of the world which contain information beyond structure (e.g., taste, colour, beauty, etc.) would seem to be attributed in our indirect representation of the world. According to Feser, “. . . physics gives us positive reason to believe that the redness and sweetness are not [emphasis original] in the apples; for like every other physical object, an apple is in reality nothing more than a collection of colorless, tasteless particles” (126). One way of thinking about structural realism is that objects do possess intrinsic nature, it’s just that such nature can’t be known via perception — rather, only via introspection[7]. But I am suggesting a variant where objects in the world have no intrinsic meaning or purpose, rather, such “nature” is attributed by people. The perceived nature of objects is a creation of the introspective human mind rather than a discovery of the introspective human mind. The latter understanding of structural realism provides further evidence that many human understandings of the world are not facts of the world, but rather are human creations.
Ontology Versus Epistemology
I have made a detailed claim that people create representations of the world, which although informed by objective reality are distinct from the world in itself. By some accounts, the objective world may contain structure but not intrinsic meaning. According to Russell, science reveals basic physical structure, but not meanings that people attribute to the world, which includes cultural commitments such as those at issue in this paper. Therefore, things in the world can generally be divided into two domains based upon their modes of existence: Ontologically objective (independent of human perception) and ontologically subjective (dependent upon human perception).
But this is not to say that ontologically subjective phenomena necessarily exist privately in the minds of individual people: A different sort of objectivity can arise even in the ontologically subjective domain, namely epistemic objectivity, i.e., the ability to acquire publicly knowledge about subjectively constructed things. Culturally constructed norms, values, and indeed metaphysical theories fall into this category. John Searle describes this phenomenon as institutional reality. An example is money (126–128). Plastic or paper currency and metal coins have no more ontologically objective value than the material from which they care manufactured. But human institutions — i.e., collective subjectivity — constructs value whose mode of existence is subjective in that it exists only in human minds. Moreover, as noted above, Searle asserts that people can mistakenly impute function, purposiveness, and value to the natural world, where in fact such meaning is attributed only by people. Importantly, institutional reality “ . . . can seem as epistemically objective as geology . . . ” (Mind, Language 132). I suggest that cultural values (like the ones discussed in this paper) are also examples of institutional reality, therefore they are epistemically objective and publicly known — even though they are ontologically subjective (their truth depends on the perceptions of observers)[8][9].
I now wish to review the essential claim I have made thus far, viz., representations of the world are constructed by people. People live their daily lives making an unconscious assumption that their impressions of the world outside themselves are identical to the world itself. But if it is the case that humans perceive the world indirectly via representation which is constructed in their minds, then it is possible that perceived meaning, cultural values, and metaphysical theories are part of that representation. That is to say, if much of human perception and consciousness is ontologically subjective, then it may be the case that what appears to us as real-in-the-world may indeed be real, but only relative to human agents. If there were no human observers, then the world would not “know” such phenomena.
To the extent Eurocentric cultural commitments are situated in the domain of the ontologically subjective, a new world of possibility emerges. Subjective creations of the human mind are potentially changeable by human minds. I have argued that the human perception of the world is a mind representation. If this is the case, then the representation is potentially changeable. Rational thought might inform us that our representation does not serve us well. Although I see two fingers when holding my hand close to my face, my rational mind tells me that only one is there. Indeed, I will present evidence that at least some elements of our representations of the world are culturally relative and thus are situated within the domain of the ontologically subjective — and are therefore changeable.
A Possible Objection
Importantly, I am not making a claim for conventional ethical relativism, i.e., the authoritative sources of moral values are individual cultures (Pojman and Fieser 17). To claim that some values are culturally relative is not to claim that there are no universalizable moral facts.
But this point, one might object that there is inconsistency in my argument: On one hand, I am suggesting that people construct (make up) “facts” about the world, attribute meaning to essentially meaningless physical structure, and communities of people construct institutional reality. On the other hand, I am asserting that there may be objective, universalizable moral facts. The problem might be stated as: If the world is divided into two domains, viz., the ontologically objective composed of physical structure, and the ontologically subjective composed of human-mind construction, then in which domain does morality reside?
My response is as follows: Moral facts, if they exist, (e.g., imperatives against causing harm and suffering) are distinct from cultural values (which might include interpretations and implementations of such moral imperatives). For example, “do not kill” may be a universalizable moral imperative, yet one society considers abortion to be killing while another society does not. Yet both societies recognize the universal moral imperative. In this scenario, the interpretation and implementation of universalizable moral facts are relative to culture (and potentially changeable), not core moral values themselves. Indeed, I argue in this paper that to fulfill recognized moral obligations of affording human rights, for example, Western culture must rework its interpretation of religion to be inclusive of diverse religious beliefs and practices.
As to the metaphysical question of whether morality is objective or subjective: That is a difficult problem which is beyond the scope of this paper. What is important to my thesis at hand is that moral claims are distinct from other cultural values, the latter of which clearly fall into the domain of the ontologically subjective yet epistemically objective. Whatever the metaphysical nature of morality, the thesis of this paper remains relevant in that Eurocentric culture perpetuates contradictions between the moral facts it asserts, and cultural commitments which are interpretations and implementations. For example, fundamental human rights are “protected” by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are justified as universalizable moral facts, but Eurocentric cultural commitments — which are ontologically subjective — sometimes hinder the full implementation of those protections.
Examples Of Problematic Eurocentric Cultural Commitments
Following are several examples of core Western metaphysical theories, which I claim have a subjective mode of existence (they are ontologically subjective).
The Neoplatonist great chain of being
The early medieval philosophers developed a model of the world, which gives us one insight into the roots of Western metaphysics. This hierarchal view of the world can be traced to the early scholastic philosophers such as Augustine, who were influenced by Plato and Plotinus (Kaye 30). According to Kaye, “The great chain of being is a cosmic scale according to which the absolute value of everything can be measured” (37). From high to low value, the hierarchy is: God, angels, humans, animals, plants, and rocks. Significantly, Kaye states that “We can ultimately trace the great chain of being back to Plato’s notion of perfection” (38). To the extent Plato and the scholastics are influential in Western metaphysics, we can see how this vertical model attaches more value to humans than the rest of the natural world, and moreover atomizes human, plant, and “non-living” features of the biosphere onto distinct hierarchal levels. It seems to justify control and exploitation, rather than mutuality and cooperation.
Cartesian metaphysics
Descartes’s search for indubitable truth and the Achaemenian point leads to dualism: The thinking mind, which is known intuitively, is the only certainty; therefore, it must be a separate entity from the physical world, which is known via sense perceptions which can be doubted. But, according to Descartes, only humans have such a mind. He values reason primarily, but only humans are capable of it. Animals act only mechanistically, and therefore “have no interests or well-being to take into consideration when considering the effects of our actions” (Wilson). This view of humans as superior-and moreover, not accountable to other life forms is at the root of Western metaphysics and helps explain the difficulty those advocating an integrated approach to the biosphere and responsibility to other life forms encounter.
Atomized view of the earth
Aristotelian metaphysics recognize goal-directedness of species to survive and reproduce. The parts of individual organisms are goal-directed towards the existence of the whole. But Aristotle stops short of recognizing that species are themselves working part of a larger organism — earth. But James Lovelock sees a living earth[10] itself as a goal-seeking entity, which he calls “Gaia.” Thus, Lovelock extends the concept of goal-directedness to the earth as a whole: “I call Gaia [the living earth] a physiological a system because it appears to have the unconscious goal of regulating the climate and the chemistry at comfortable state for life . . . We have to think of Gaia as the whole system of animate and inanimate parts” (15).
The important point is that Lovelock claims Gaia to be self-regulating. He documents how the earth regulates its temperature via interactions between water and organisms (27–31). Further, claims Lovelock, the earth maintains a stable chemical composition: “The intricate links between algae living in the oceans, sulphur gas production, atmospheric chemistry, cloud physics, and climate are slowly being uncovered . . . (31). It seems to me that such self-regulation might be analogized to that accomplished by a human being. Perhaps the traditional Eurocentric view, in its microscopic viewpoint, has failed to see the macroscopic. If one were focused on atomized hands, feet, lungs, and hearts, one might fail to see the entire human as a self-regulating system.
Further, some interpretations of Darwinian evolution assert an atomized view of species, in that each species is directed towards a self-interested competition for resources; only the fittest survive. Per Lovelock, “Some biologists . . . argued that a self-regulating biosphere never could have evolved, since the organism was the unit of selection, not the biosphere” (23). But Lovelock, while affirming evolutionary theory in general, denies this atomized account. As evidence, he claims the existence of “altruistic” traits which can be best explained in that they are beneficial to other species, and thus to the overall balance of life. An example is that animals (including humans) excrete nitrogen in liquid form (urea), rather than in a gaseous form, at considerable expense to themselves of energy and water; and this, Lovelock suggests, to benefit plant life on earth (18–19). Further, Lovelock argues that the traditional account of a “fixed” biosphere to which species adapt is wrong: rather, organisms actively change the biosphere (26). If one understands the world in this way, it makes sense that Gaia is a dynamic, self-adjusting, entity which seeks balance and sustenance in a way like what Aristotle discovered in individual species.
Importantly, Lovelock documents that resistance from the scientific community in accepting Gaia as a self-regulating entity is beginning to weaken. He says: “. . . the ice began to melt” in 2001, when thousands of delegates from “four principal global-change organizations signed a declaration that has as its first main statement: ‘The Earth System behaves as a single, self-regulating system comprised of physical, chemical, biological and human components.’” (25).
Lovelock’s work is relevant to my thesis in these ways: One, he presents credible justification for questioning traditional Eurocentric metaphysical claims about teleology (e.g., Aristotle), and a view of evolutionary theory which denies that the earth itself could be governed by a natural selection process. Two, he documents how such metaphysical values are indeed changing, which three, supports my foundational premise that they are ontologically subjective and therefore can change.
Conception of religion
Throughout European history, the church has been highly structured and institutionalized. Moreover, the Catholic church was inexorably intertwined with the development of the professional academic institutions of the medieval period. According to Kaye, “Even during the darkest part of the medieval period, the Catholic Church needed schools to educate priests. Over time these schools gave rise to the university system we know today” (3). Even beyond the structure of the university, religious belief influenced academic content. As Kaye further points out, “The Church was concerned to show how religious faith could be reconciled with scientific reasoning. It therefore required theology students to examine statements from religion and science that appear to conflict and show how the conflict could be resolved” (3)[11]. It is not surprising that the very concept of religion would be modeled on such institutional structures, (and that theistic content would sometimes dance with “secular” philosophy itself).
Autonomy
Eurocentric metaphysics asserts principles of autonomy and freedom to purse one’s goals within one’s personal space. According to Vanderheiden, “John Rawls’s primary goods, Ronald Dworkins resources, and Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach all focus on instrumental goods within a metric of egalitarian justice, allowing individuals full control over their personal spaces of autonomy . . . “ (Atmospheric Justice 257). But it is not within Eurocentric cultural commitments to consider that the earth itself would be such a being entitled to such autonomy. According to Borrows, “The fact that Anishinabek religion and law treat the Earth as a living being with the power of choice, requiring respect for its autonomy, privacy, and personal convictions, might seem to fit within a liberal framework . . . However, the notion that the Earth is the individual possessing these characteristics probably propels Canadian constitutional law beyond its informing commitments” (249). To give the earth rights of a human being might seem far-fetched to readers informed by Eurocentric philosophy. Indeed, according to Locke, the earth exists merely for the benefit of people: “God, who has given the world to men in common, has also given then reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience” (Second Treatise 43; 5.26). But the United States Supreme Court gave us an (arguably) more preposterous concept: That corporations (subjective creations of institutional reality) are people for some purposes (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission). But to think of the earth as a living organism is consistent with contemporary ecological science. If Eurocentric society were to rethink its assumptions and the earth were granted a status like personhood, there would be new legal justification to protect the environment and to curb greenhouse gasses — endeavours which are constantly running into roadblocks in Eurocentric context of lower status granted the earth relative to humans.
Separately, with the realities of technological “progress” and development, as well as improved scientific elucidation of hidden externalities of living within one’s “person space,” i.e., ecological footprint, the amount of personal space within one can maneuver without impacting others is now shown to be vanishingly small. According to Vanderheiden, “Since neatly all of my acts and choices make claims on ecological space, justice can no longer be theorized primarily in terms of goods designed to maximize or maintain personal space, but must instead begin with considerations of how much shared space any person may defensibly claim” (Atmospheric Justice 258). Thus, the pursuit of global justice now requires a reworking of cultural commitments about space towards an understanding that virtually all personal pursuits impact others.
Land ownership
True to modern liberal Western values, an exhibit at a museum in Victoria, British Columbia approached the human history of the province from the indigenous point of view[12]. Rather than adopting the perspective of European settlers who “encountered” natives, the exhibit portrays indigenous history long before European contact, and examines the impact of contact on aboriginal communities (such as introduction of disease, and effects on religion and cultural practices). But for all the progressive intent and efforts of the exhibit designers and museum curators, there was evidence that they could not escape their (probably unconscious) Eurocentric cultural commitments. For example, a sign stated, “What follows is an overview of aboriginal peoples who have occupied the land now known as British Columbia.” There are at least two culturally-based concepts implicit in this sign. One, it accepts the status (“British Columbia”) assigned by the European conquerors. It implies that even if the land were unjustly claimed, the statute of limitations must have run by now, and the land’s status as European property is cemented. Second and more fundamental to my thesis is the phenomenon of conflating physical land with a political entity. These two things have distinct modes of existence — the former being objective and the latter being subjective, i.e., institutional reality. In a metaphysical sense, this statement reveals the Eurocentric commitment to a necessary connection between political states and the land under the feet of its inhabitants — that is to say, human ownership of land[13].
But the profound importance of the institutional reality of land and property ownership in Western culture is exemplified in Lockean theory. Indeed, according to Locke, preservation of property is the “great and chief end” of the political state (Second Treatise 91; 9.124). But this is more than just a political claim: According to Locke, “The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being” (Second Treatise 43; 5.26). Locke goes on to argue that through labour an individual can lay claim to land as his private property, which might be considered a political assertion; but that a human can own land at all, and that the earth was given to men, is a metaphysical claim. This doctrine is in direct contradiction to those of some other cultures, such as the indigenous Anishinabek of the Canadian Great Lakes region. The Anishinabek view themselves as trustees rather than owners of land (Borrows 246). This leads to an implicit directive — a fiduciary duty — to preserve the integrity of the environment for future generations.
Consequences of Problematic Eurocentric cultural commitments
Because of Western metaphysical commitments such as those described above, there are several serious challenges facing the contemporary world. I will discuss a few of them.
Ecological sustainability and moral obligations
Western metaphysical constructions of an atomized Earth have led to failure to understand Gaia as itself a living being. This has resulted, per Lovelock, in perilous changes to the “surface and atmosphere” of the earth at the hands of the industrial world (26). Says Lovelock, “If the middle management of science had been somewhat less reactionary about Gaia, we might have had twenty more years in which to resolve the much more difficult human and political decisions about our future” (26).
If Locke’s claim that the earth was given to people for their support and comfort were true, it would seem necessary to treat it well and sustain it so it might continue to provide such support. This is one of the arguments made by those advocating to curb unsustainable exploitation of the earth; however, the background of Eurocentric metaphysics creates many hurdles. In contrast, a metaphysical system such as that of the Anishinabek, which begins with humans as trustees rather than recipients, assumes an obligation to protect. But in Eurocentric culture, the concepts of sustainability and environmental protection are relatively recent and are in tension with private land ownership values, as well as individual autonomy itself. European culture is struggling with justification for (and co-operation with) environmental protection, whereas aboriginal “trustees” are assume an obligation to protect the environment for future generations. If Eurocentric societies are to honour their moral commitments to future generations, then they must rework their ideas of earth as given by God for human exploitation, as well as their commitments to land ownership rather than trusteeship.
Moral obligations of justice, as well as teleological tendencies towards reproduction of the human species, both recognized in Western philosophy, are challenged by inequality in resource consumption, disproportionate negative consequences of overconsumption endured by disadvantaged peoples, and threats to the integrity of the biosphere itself. The Western commitment to autonomy is now known to be in tension with new scientific understandings that ecological space[14] is limited by resource availability and consequences of resource appropriation and waste production (Vanderheiden 257). Ecological space utilized by the average American is 5.1 hectares, whereas that of the average Indian is just 0.38 hectares (Vanderheiden 260). This situation is unsustainable, per Vanderheiden: “ . . . the world is currently an ecological deficit of 0.4 hectares/person . . .if all current persons were to consume resources and produce waste at the rate of the average American, we would need the ecological capacity of an additional three earths in order to support this one planet’s human population alone” (261).
Religious Freedom
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees “freedom of religion. But this seemingly simple principle turns out to be challenging when one realizes that religion is a contested concept. As Burrows states, “. . . Indigenous spiritual practices may flounder when judges fail to make appropriate distinctions between Indigenous religion and certain Christian practices. Common law understandings cannot be appropriately read into Indigenous legal traditions” (252). Further, “Canadian constitutional principles dealing with freedom of religion draw on ancient cultural traditions with their origins in the ‘religious struggles of post-reformation Europe,’ not in Indigenous North America” (249). Indeed, per Burrows, “Anishinabek spiritual beliefs may not be labelled religious because they can lack many of the outward forms of other worship systems. They are not often taught in churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, or cathedrals” (252).The problem created by a culturally-informed understanding of religion was further exemplified by the Supreme Court of Canada (Jack and Charlie v. The Queen). A Coast Salish practice of killing a dear for a ceremony to nourish a deceased ancestor violated the B.C. Wildlife Act. Had the court understood religious meaning of the practice, it might have found that freedom of religion trumped the wildlife statute. But the court denied the religious significance of killing a deer because using frozen meat retained in storage was a sufficient alternative (Borrows 251). The court decision compared the Coast Salish practice, which included both the killing of the deer and the ceremony, to a scenario where a clergyman obtains wine illegally for a Christian ceremony: “No clergyman could raise a defence based on religious freedom, to a charge of obtaining wine illegally while liquor stores were closed, simply because it was intended to use the wine for the sacrament of Holy Communion”. The frozen meat solution might fit neatly within Eurocentric tradition, but completely misses the point of the Coast Salish ritual. It seems that the “freedom of religion” guarantee becomes hollow if the definition of “religion” is culturally biased and exclusive.
Conclusion
I have made a detailed argument that people construct a representation of the world, which they often incorrectly believe to be identical to the world itself. The representation is informed, in part, by the ontologically objective structure of the world. But the representation contains many inaccuracies due to missing, altered, and added data. Further, representations of the world may mistakenly suggest that phenomena such as cultural values are hard-wired into the objective world, when in actuality they are subjective constructions of the human mind (or collective human minds).
My claim is more profound than the familiar (and often rejected) claim of cultural relativism, viz., the empirical fact that metaphysics varies from culture to culture is in itself proof that such beliefs are subjective, not objective. Such a claim is typically thought to be an is-ought fallacy, viz., the objection is that the way things are (diverse) doesn’t entail the way things ought to be because despite the diversity there is an objectively “correct” theory, whether recognized as such or not. Rather than appealing to observational diversity, I have made rational arguments premised upon several theories, such as indirect realism and the theory of institutional reality, as to why beliefs we may hold to be objectively true (ontologically) are not so.
I want to deal with one additional issue: The debate concerning teleology. Do species evolve because of a goal, or rather just accidental mutations and natural selection? According to Aristotelian metaphysics, species are goal-directed towards fulfilling their purpose, and toward reproduction. However, some modern philosophers such as John Searle seem to deny the existence of purposiveness in the objective world — rather, it is attributed by people. On the other hand, Lovelock and the Anishinabek suggest that the Western notion of teleology in nature doesn’t go far enough — the earth itself (not just species) is goal-directed. The question is: Does my thesis hold up in either scenario, viz., teleology exists in the objective world, or it is merely attributed to the world by people? My answer is that it does. Whether the biosphere is self-regulating in a purposive way, or simply as an accident of evolution, it remains in our interest to preserve it for our benefit and that of future generations. Moreover, people might perceive “intrinsic” beauty and value in the natural world; even if such value is ontologically subjective, i.e., attributed by people. Although I make a distinction between ontologically objective and ontologically subjective phenomena in the sense of their alterability, in no way do I claim that the latter is worthless or should be disregarded. Even if the objective world is nothing but meaningless stuff, structure, and causal chains, there may be value to human attributions. If human rights and preservation of the biosphere “mean” nothing to the world beyond human perception itself, they may be nonetheless worth pursuing for the sake of ontologically subjective, yet epistemically objective, human experience.
People often assume that they perceive the world in the way that they do because that is simply how the world is. But it is incorrect to assume, for example, that money is ontologically objective, that species merely engage in self-interested competition for survival, and that the earth is not a self-regulating entity which has at least some important characteristics of a living being. To significant degrees, these flawed assumptions have been important constituents of Eurocentric philosophy. However, there is a metaphysical basis, even in Western philosophy, to challenge that which appears to us as real: Indirect realism suggests we interact merely with representations of the world which might be flawed, and an understanding of institutional reality suggests that much of what is epistemically objective has a subjective mode of existence. Constructions of individual or collective human minds are subject to change, and they do change.
Finally, my claim concisely is that the earth is facing ecological crises, and Eurocentric cultures face significant challenges in fulfilling obligations to human rights; and therefore, there is good reason to reexamine and update, when necessary, our cultural commitments — and we can do so, because they are ontologically subjective. Once Westerners become aware that their commitments to such things as religion, individual autonomy, and land ownership are mind constructions, then the door opens to modify them when justified. When such commitments, if stagnant, stand in the way of fulfilling moral obligations to human rights and to protecting the earth for present and future generations, goals which are themselves recognized by Eurocentric culture, then a need for resolution justifies updating such cultural commitments.
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[1] Eurocentric philosophy is that which is derived from Europe and the Anglo-American, i.e., Western world According to the New York Times, “of the top 50 philosophy doctoral programs in the English-speaking world, only 15 percent have any regular faculty members who teach any non-Western philosophy” (If Philosophy Won’t Diversify).
[2] Physical objects are known as ordinary objects, whereas representations of objects are non-ordinary objects (Crane and French).
[3] One might object that we can infer the existence of radio waves, microwaves, and x-rays via their effects, or via sense-extenders. We know that these waves exist, even if we are asleep or not conscious of them. But such inferred knowledge does not form part of our conscious here-and-now representation of nature with which we navigate the world.
[4] Evolutionary theory suggests that our natural senses developed over long periods of time, to allow people to navigate safely in their natural environment. But technological use of radioactive substance, introducing dangers of large-scale radioactive contamination into the human environment, is only a recent development.
[5] But thankfully, we might rightly claim knowledge of the actual coin without absolute certainty (Crumley II 21–24).
[6] However, Searle asserts direct realism in favour of indirect realism. I argue this is a contradiction on Searle’s part (Caditz).
[7] This is related to the mind/body theory of neutral monism: That the brain and mind are one kind of thing. Perception provides one view of the brain/mind and we call this view “material.” But first-person introspection of thoughts, feelings, qualia, etc. provides access to the intrinsic nature of the brain/mind. In either case one is aware of the same object (Feser, Philsophy of Mind 135).
[8] See Searle for a discussion of ontological versus epistemic modes of existence, and their ramifications for science (Mind, Language 43–44).
[9] Indeed, this is the project of a naturalistic social science, i.e., to find causal laws governing the human mind (Rosenberg 12)
[10] This is not to say that the earth is alive in a “sentient way.” Lovelock proposes expanding the definition of “life” to that beyond “something that reproduces ands corrects the errors of reproduction by natural selection among the progeny (16)”. Presumably he has in mind self-regulating systems like Gaia, which don’t “reproduce,” but are apparently goal-directed towards sustaining themselves — in the case of Gaia, by “regulating its climate and chemistry (17)”. This is another example of a call to update traditional Eurocentric metaphysics.
[11] Even today, theistic scholars are careful to point out that many of the arguments for the existence of God are compatible with Darwinian evolutionary theory. For example, regarding Aquinas’s Fifth Way teleological argument, Feser states, “ . . .while Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is notoriously problematic for the [intelligent] design argument, it is totally irrelevant to the Fifth Way” (112).
[12] This is a contemporary exhibit at the Royal BC Museum (First Peoples Galleries).
[13] To illustrate that such metaphysical assertion of land ownership is not necessary, one can imagine a nomadic state with all the necessary characteristics that bind together a political society. But since it never stayed in the same geographical location for long, it laid claim to no land. Rather, its identity was tied to relationships between people. Since we can conceive of such a community, it is plausible that the connection between a political state and physical land is not an ontologically objective feature of the world — rather, it is institutional reality.
[14] Ecological space: Life-supporting natural resource-based goods and services, conceived in spatial terms (Vanderheiden 257).
