MODERN CHALLENGES TO EUROCENTRIC METAPHYSICS AND ITS APPLICATION (ABSTRACT)
The following is a description of my research project, which I am pursuing in the context of a for-credit course. The course outline is attached, and included herein by reference.
If Western (Eurocentric) philosophy is to be a living and dynamic pursuit which is relevant to current-day issues, rather than a mere historical account of profoundly unsolvable dilemmas, long-held theories must be subject to constant scrutiny and revision. For example: Considering globalization, advances in science, newly recognized ecological threats, and increased awareness and respect for non-Western worldviews, we must consider how traditional ethics can be applied to inter-generational consequences of global warming. These challenges to (and opportunities for) Western philosophy come both from within and without.
Aristotelian metaphysics, an underpinning of Western philosophy (but by no means universally accepted) is subject to critique from within Eurocentric philosophy. Various iterations of nominalism suggest that Aristotle’s “universals,” purported to exist in the objective world as observer-independent kinds and categories of things, may be no more than universal “nouns,” viz., constructions of the human mind. Similarly, Searle advances a theory of institutional reality, which asserts that humans collectively assign teleology to the outside world, but perceived purposiveness in nature is observer-relative, not observer-independent (118–122).
From without Western tradition, the indigenous Anishinabek culture of the Great Lakes region seems to see the natural world quite differently than Aristotle, lending support both to nominalism (universals are “nouns” subject to human construction) and to Searle’s institutional reality claim (humans collectively construct some types of “objective” reality). As characterized by Borrows, “For the Anishinabek . . . The Earth grows and develops or dies and decays because it is a living being subject to many of the same forces as all other living creatures. Many Anishinabek people characterize the Earth as a living entity who has thoughts and feelings, can exercise agency by making choices, and is related to humans at the deepest generative level of existence” (242). Without taking sides as to which metaphysical claim is “correct,” viz., Aristotle’s discreet universals or the Anishinabek single living organism of earth, the fundamental difference between the two is confirming evidence for Searle’s theory of observer-relativity.
The relevance of philosophy to pressing practical problems in today’s world depends on our ability to revise it as necessary, which may include considering non-European worldviews. Borrows argues that limited Eurocentric understandings of “religion” might impede the ability of liberal democratic institutions, e.g., the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to deliver on its promises. Per Borrows, “While Canadian constitutional law may on rare occasions transcend its cultural context and informing commitments, it continues to draw significant inspiration from its common law parentage” (259). For example, says Borrows, “Anishinabek beliefs may not be regarded as ‘religion,’ interference with Anishinabek rights might be thought trivial, and infringement upon those rights may be found reasonable in Canada’s ‘free and democratic society’ (259). Thus, the question of what is “rational,” a central criterion of liberal democratic justification, appears to be itself informed by cultural commitments.
Rawlsian solutions to problems of justice, as exemplified in his “original position” thought experiment, might be inadequate in addressing international, inter-generational, and ecological challenges. The claims and illuminations of current-day thinkers such as Sen, Nussbaum, Habermas, and Vanderheiden must be considered in understanding problems and solutions relevant to today’s social and natural world. Vanderheiden argues that Rawls’s famous difference principle, though well-intentioned, is oblivious to aggregate limits on primary goods, and new understandings of ecology call into question Lock’s libertarian assumptions that each person can occupy generously-allocated private space wherein to exercise freedom without impeding that of others (266–269). Lock’s (and Western) presumptions of property ownership are themselves Eurocentrically informed: Traditional Anishinabek culture and law recognize no such rights. Per Borrows, “Under Anishinabek law, land is held by the present generation for future generations. Land does not ultimately belong to a person or people in the sense that they have absolute discretion or control; land is provisionally held for (con)temporary sustenance and for those unborn” (246).
Finally, members of future generations may have rights which need to be defined and respected by a contemporarily-relevant philosophy. Is it morally, or politically acceptable to force future generations to bear the costs and consequences of an ever-warming world with rising sea levels? Seeking an answer, Moellendorf develops justifiable strategies for expanding Rawls’s original position model to include accountability and justice to future generations (204–224).
In summary, to remain relevant, philosophy must address questions such as those raised by the aforementioned thinkers. My research project is one of exploring, in both width and depth, the issues and proposed solutions raised in the works I have cited, and other contemporary works. I intend to do my small part in insuring that the discipline of philosophy remains relevant
as a useful tool not only in understanding historical roots of Western thinking, but also in solving contemporary and emergent problems. This undoubtedly requires an understanding which transcends Eurocentric cultural commitments.
Works Cited
Borrows, John. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution. University of Toronto Press, 1963. Print.
Moellendorf, Darrel. “Justice and the Assignment of the Intergenerational Costs of Climate Change.” Journal of Social Philosophy 40.2 (2009): 204–224. Print.
Searle, John R. Mind, Language and Society. New York: Basic Book, 1998. Book.
Vanderheiden, Steve. “Allocating Ecological Space.” Journal of Social Philosophy 40.2 (2009): 257–275. Print.
