Hobbes’s Error, and Problems with Social Contract Theory ֘

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes is a leading proponent and defender of social contract theory. Hobbes’s model is premised upon a dark view of human nature. I will argue that Hobbes’s view is unjustifiable, and his social contract theory, which presumes that the “state of nature” is an awful place in which no rational person would want to reside, is flawed. Other philosophers offer variations of social contracts which address some of the problems inherent in Hobbes’s invention; indeed, variations of social contract theory are part of the foundation of modern liberal democracies.

Overview of Social Contract Theory

Social contract theory is a constructivist model of ethics which asserts that morality is not discovered, but rather is “constructed [emphasis original] by social groups, and exists for the benefit of those groups” (Waller 134). This distinction is crucial, because it differentiates social contract theory from both deontological and utilitarian ethics. Deontological ethics holds that moral worth of an action is determined by the intrinsic nature of the action itself, and can be discovered through means such as reason, intuition, or emotion. Utilitarian ethics requires that the morality of an action is determined by performing a pleasure versus pain calculation on the consequences of such action. Both deontological and utilitarian theories hold that moral truth, therefore, is not manufactured by humans, but rather discovered through proper methods of inquisition. In stark contrast, social contract theorists assert that no morality exists independent of that which is constructed by people (although they offer differing accounts of “natural” rights).

Psychological Egoism and Hobbes’s Version of Social Contract Theory

Hobbes is a psychological egoist, because he asserts that when in a “natural” state, humans always act in their self-interest. There are at least two ways to understand psychological egoism. One suggests that it is not logically possible to act except in our self-interest: Even acts that are apparently unselfish, e.g., rescuing someone from drowning or donating to charity, are motivated by the good feelings they produce in us — ultimately, therefore, a selfish motive. Thus, all acts are performed because of the perceived benefit to us personally. At the very minimum, we help others because we want to think of ourselves as the kind of person who help others; to think of ourselves that way feels good. Altruism, therefore, does not exist; every apparent selfless act is ultimately performed to make the actor feel good.

Another view of psychological egoism is that although it may be possible for us to act selflessly (unlike per the previous analysis), it is unnatural for us to do so. Hobbes is a proponent of this type of psychological egoism. Hobbes makes an empirical claim that because there are neither natural laws nor divine commands which define moral behaviour, human beings act, by default, only in their self-interest. The resultant “state of nature,” unless mitigated by the authority of an unaccountable sovereign (dictator) and social contracts to which all people are bound, is one of constant civil war, a brutish and short life, and violent death. However, because Hobbes claims that people can be coerced or incentivized to act against their perceived self-interest by the sovereign and by their social contract obligations, he seems to acknowledge that non-egoistic behaviour is possible (albeit not natural).

Where Hobbes Goes Wrong

But Hobbes’s empirical claim about human nature is questionable because he makes inferences to human nature from a non-representative sample of humans. Hobbes lived in a time of great upheaval and prolonged religious wars in Europe: Hobbes’s observational sample of humans consisted of fighting young men: Life expectancy in 1600 England was only 35 years (Lambert), and few people lived past 45 (Woodbury). Thus, Hobbes’s sample (young European males) from which he inferred conclusions about human nature was hardly representative of humans in general, and was unrepresentative as to relevant properties (sex, geographical and cultural locale, and age). Indeed, young males may be more prone to violence than the human population in general: A 1988 study showed that 80 percent of homicides in Canada were committed by males between the ages of sixteen and forty; between 1985 and 1995 males of all ages accounted for 87 percent of homicides (Paciocco 27). Apart from his non-representative sample of humans, Hobbes’s personal experiences and feelings may have produced confirmation bias in his conclusions about human nature: “Hobbes’s greatest fear was social and political chaos — and he had ample opportunity both to observe it and to suffer its effects” (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

There is significant disconfirming evidence for psychological egoism. Per Waller: “Far from selfish egoism being a universal truth, the fact is that we can find examples of unselfish generosity not only among humans but in other species as well . . . the presence of some level of unselfish behavior is sufficient to undercut the claims of psychological egoism” (23). Bishop Joseph Butler famously denies psychological egoism in his claim that while “self-love” exists, humans also care, by nature, for “external objects”:

There is then a distinction between the cool principle of self- love, or general desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature, and one principle of action; and the particular affections towards particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of action. How much soever therefore is to be allowed to self- love, yet it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other parts or principles which come into it. (371–381)

Another serious problem with psychological egoism is that it is not falsifiable. It is an empty claim, because, per Waller, “nothing could count as an unselfish act, since every purposeful act has some motivation, and the egoist is redefining all motivations as selfish”. This makes the claim of psychological egoism a tautology: All selfish acts are selfish acts. (22) If psychological egoism is a tautology and reduces all actions to selfishness, we should eliminate the theory as meaningless, and accept that there is a substantive difference between selfish and selfless actions.

Finally, psychological egoism seems to entail a fallacious false dilemma. If I volunteer for community service which will help others and simultaneously strengthen my graduate school application, must my motivation be one or the other? My motivation may be some of each: helping others and simultaneously helping myself.

Problematic Assumptions of Social Contract Theory

Aside from Hobbes’s assertion that humans are by nature egoists with no innate morality, social contract theory entails additional assumptions as defined by Waller (141–142). One, our only obligations are those defined in the social contract to which we’ve agreed. There are no moral obligations which are separate from (or override) our contractual obligations. A problem with this assumption is that it eliminates the distinction between morality and law; they become one in the same. But, we know that laws can be immoral. For example, slave ownership in the American south was enshrined into law, but was it not immoral? If morality is identical to social contract and law, then on what basis can we challenge Nazism? Is not genocide, or torturing children, morally wrong irrespective of whether it is recognized as such by a contract and law?

Two, social contracts are not inclusive of all. As Waller states, “If you can’t join in the contract, and you can’t live up to the demands of the contract, then you aren’t part of the moral community” (141). Per Martha Nussbaum, this is a big problem because people with lifelong impairments are excluded: “The failure to deal adequately with the needs of citizens with impairments and disabilities is a serious flaw in modern theories that conceive of basic political principles as the result of a contract for mutual advantage. The flaw goes deep, affecting their adequacy as accounts of human justice more generally” (98). Further, social contracts exclude those in different societies and countries — and they exclude animals — all to whom we therefore have no contractual, and thus no moral obligations. We may choose to treat such outsiders with respect and compassion, but we have no moral duty to do so. However, many people recognize compassion as a moral principle — not just a preference — leaving social contract theory as an inadequate moral theory.

Variants of Social Contract Theory

It is important not to dismiss social contract theory altogether just because one might view Hobbes’s conclusions as flawed. John Rawls does not fully share Hobbes’s speculation about the state of nature being a cruel place, yet he advocates for social contracts which promote “justice as fairness” (138). Rawls arrives at moral principles via the social contract — e.g., justice, equality, non-discrimination, respect — which are not unlike morality asserted by liberal deontological theorists such as Kant. To arrive at a such a contract, Rawls proposes a thought experiment called the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil, you find yourself with all other humans waiting to be “placed” on Earth. First, you must all agree on the rules — though no one knows what his abilities, characteristics, race, gender, etc., will be in life. Per Rawls, this initial “ignorance” should inspire rational people to construct a social contract which is equitable (and democratic, unlike Hobbes’s vision of dictatorship).

Rousseau further contradicts Hobbes’s views by suggesting that pity, which indeed exists in the state of nature, actually has an advantage over the laws of civil society: “Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering. Pity is what, in the state of nature, takes the place of laws, mores, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its sweet voice” (38).

Similarly, John Locke rejects Hobbes’s version of the state of nature. Locke believes in “natural rights” including life, liberty, and happiness — whereas, we recall, Hobbes asserts that there are no natural rights. As a result of Locke’s more positive view of nature, he proposes a more limited social contract than does Hobbes, insisting on “preserving the individual rights of citizens against the temptations of social rulers to become tyrants” (Waller 136). Locke is notably influential on Thomas Jefferson and on the United States Constitution, itself an instance of social contract. (Whether the United States Constitution is ultimately successful in thwarting tyrants remains to be determined.)

Summary

Hobbes makes an empirical claim that humans are psychological egoists and there are no moral laws in a state of nature. However, as an inference, his process utilized in making this claim is seriously flawed. That his non-representative observational sample shows a propensity for warfare is weak evidence for his conclusion about the entire population of humans. To the contrary, there is evidence in the world that people often act out of compassion. He asserts that morality exists only as the product of social contracts, yet we are left with no basis to assert that a contract or law is immoral. Social contracts exclude non-parties from the moral community, thereby negating the rights of handicapped people, people in other societies, and animals. Variations of social contract theory promoted by other philosophers such as Rawls, Rousseau, and Locke address some of these problems. Modern liberal democracies are founded upon variants of social contract theory.

Works Cited

Butler, Bishop. “Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel.” Journal of Anthropological Research 53.3 (n.d.): 371–381.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political Philosophy.” n.d. Web. 15 11 2016. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/#H5>.

Lambert, Tim. “A Brief History of Life Expectancy in Britain.” n.d. Web. 15 11 2016. <http://www.localhistories.org/life.html>.

Nussbaum, Martha C. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, n.d. Book.

Paciocco, David M. Getting Away with Murder: The Canadian Criminal Justice System. Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999. Print.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques and Donald A. Cress. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992. Book.

Waller, Bruce N. Consider Ethics. Theory and Readings. Boston: Pearson Learning Solutions, 2016. Book.

Woodbury, Sarah. “Life Expectancy in the Middle Ages.” 11 March 2014. Romance and Fantasy in Medieval Wales. Web. 15 November 2016.